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THE LAW AND THE ART OF COMPLEXITY
(An introductory note to Cyberspace 2006)
by
RADIM POLČÁK
This was the Golden Age that, without coercion, without laws,  spontaneously  
nurtured the good and the true. There was no fear or punishment: there were no  
threatening words to be read, fixed in bronze, no crowd of suppliants fearing the  
judge’s face: they lived safely without an advocate.
Publius Ovidius Naso, Metamorphoses
Law Created and Discovered [1]
In general, there are two mainstreams in the legal doctrine and practice 
with regards to grounds of the legal normative system. First of them, let us 
call it legislative optimism, is based on an assumption that the law is based 
on the will of the lawmaker and is determinable from various lawmaker’s 
expressions or utterances.1 Taking the law from this point of view, we can 
say that the lawmaker is creating the law, while its recipients only interpret 
the  meanings  from  the  available  normative  utterances.  From  the 
methodological  point  of  view,  this  approach to the  law seems relatively 
simple,  as  the  whole  process  of  creation  and  perception  of  legal  norms 
exists within one-sided informational channel originating at the lawmaker’s 
will.  Then,  the  information  is  expressed  in  the  form  of  a  normative 
utterance2 and later it is received and interpreted by the recipient.
The key point in understanding and perceiving the law is, in the case of 
1 Such approach is typical namely for the pre-war and mid-war schools of legal positivism. 
See for example BIX, B., Legal positivism, University of Minnesota Law School, Minnesota, 
2000, p. 9 and following.
2 For axiological distinction between norm and normative utterance, see Kelsen, H. (1990), On 
the Theory of Interpretation, in Legal Studies, Vol. 10(2), p. 127, originally published as Kelsen, 
H. (1934), Zur Theorie der Interpretation, in Zeitschrift für Theorie des Rechts, Vol. 8, p. 9.
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legislative optimism, the ability of the recipient  to restore the will  of the 
lawmaker.  Thank to  dominant  communication  media,  the  language,  the 
process might be even very simple. Many times, it is possible to express the 
meaning (norm) by appropriate and precise words and to communicate it in 
official and publicly accessible form (code, precedent) to its recipients. Then, 
all  what  is  needed  for  perfect  understanding,  i.e.  recreation  of  the 
lawmaker’s  will  in the mind of the recipient,  is  just  simple  “reading the 
law.”3 There are, however, natural limits of the will of the lawmaker as well 
as there are natural limits of the language.
Unlike natural sciences, the legal doctrine, unfortunately, does not praise 
unsuccessful  scientific  attempts.  Thus,  almost  all  legal  works  including 
student’s  theses never  admit  failure or defeat of their main proposition.4 
However, there appeared some brave representatives of the legal doctrine 
and related disciplines who invested their talent and enormous efforts into 
showing the doctrine ways that do not lead to the success.  One of such 
attempts was carried out by the philosopher whose influence still shapes 
modern European history, Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz.  Besides many 
other achievements, he tried to develop such a language that would make 
possible to perfectly and precisely describe all material facts. Consequently, 
the language could be adopted also for expressing the norms. Later, the fact 
that  Leibniz  did  not  succeed  in  his  truly  titanic  task  has,  more  or  less 
paradoxically,  motivated further massive development of legal science in 
the sense that it is impossible for it to rely on the precision of the language 
as the only media for communicating the law.
Besides the limits of the language, there is second important factor acting 
against the normative optimistic understanding of the law. It is the limits of 
the lawmaker’s will (or lawmaker’s mind). Unlike in the case of application 
of law, the lawmaker has always to define the norms for the future. Thus, it 
is impossible for her to have in mind the normative orders for all possible 
practical situations. Consequently, it is many times impossible to search for 
the appropriate interpretation of the law in the mind of the lawmaker, but 
we need to creatively guess what would be her will in the case she knew 
3 For refreshing publication briefly addressing limits and challenges of the language in law, 
see the note of Sir Reginal Croom-Johnson in South African Law Journal, vol. 65, p. 537.
4 Fear of the defeat causes that many legal scientists even do not define for their works any 
propositions at all.
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about the present legal question.5
Another approach to the law that we can see in present jurisprudence does 
not consider the law as being created but only discovered. From this point of 
view, the lawmaker only reveals and articulates legal norms and principles 
instead  of  creating  them.  It  implies  that  the  activity  of  the  lawmaker, 
although useful, is not necessarily needed as it is possible for the recipients 
of legal norms to perceive them also from such sources that do not originate 
at the lawmaker.  It is  also possible  to, according  to this doctrine,  consider 
whether acts and utterances  articulated by the lawmaker are in compliance 
with the law or not – in other words, it is possible to assess whether the law 
is being discovered and articulated by the lawmaker in the proper way.6
Although  it  seems  as  an  attractive  view  on  the  law  compared  to  the 
legislative optimism, the pessimistic contraposition unfortunately does not 
offer  that  solid  grounds  or  basis  for  argumentation.  When we  critically 
separate the law and the act of the lawmaker, we regularly loose solid base 
for formulating strong arguments and we rely on individual and relatively 
vague categories like reason, fairness, natural order or the law of the God. 
That, of course, does not imply impossibility to use the pessimistic view on 
the law in doctrinal work or in legal practice – it just makes the use of law 
much  more  problematic,  relativistic  and  time  consuming.  Also,  the 
pessimistic approach makes quality of the outcome heavily dependent on 
individual abilities of the interpreter and its legitimacy on willingness of the 
recipients  to  trust  in them. Thus, the legislative pessimistic  view on law 
requires, in order to be successful compared to the optimistic arguments, 
more attention and efforts and it has to count even with such factors like 
courage, experience, wisdom, sensitivity7 or even luck.
5 Such a method of interpretation is primarily based on the teleology, but instead of trying to 
guess the actual will of the lawmaker and her contemporary aims (historic teleology), we 
try to figure out what would be the will of the lawmaker nowadays (actual or hypothetical 
teleology) – this way of teleological interpretation of law can be illustrated on many court 
rulings  out  of  which  we  may,  for  example,  choose  the  decision  of  European  Court  of 
Human Rights in rem C.R. v. United Kingdom (22/11/1995).
6 Such  grounds  are  typical  namely  for  various  streams  of  naturalist  legal  thinking  –  for 
comprehensive analysis of various schools of naturalist legal philosophy, see for example 
Bix, B. Natural Law Theory – the modern tradition. In Coleman, J. L., Shapiro, S., Handbook 
of Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 2000. 
7 Permanent empirically based criticism of formalist approaches to the law lead even into 
interesting attempts to plead the lawmaker to legislate metanormative elements into the 
positive  law  –  see  for  example  Laster,  K.  O’Malley,  P.,  Sensitive  New  Age  Laws,  in 
International Journal of the Sociology of Law, Vol. 24, p. 21.
-3-
Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology
Discovering the Law – A Matter of Experience [2]
It might seem similar to the question whether there was an egg prior to a 
chicken to ask whether there was lawmaker prior to the law or otherwise. It 
might also seem strange to ask such question in a paper dedicated to law 
and information technologies. However, in this case, relatively young area 
of  ICT  law,  although  not  entirely  settled  among  other  legal  disciplines, 
offers us such examples that can, in our opinion, substantially facilitate the 
answer on the question whether the law has priority in existence compared 
to the lawmaker. Consequently, it is possible to use empiric experience with 
the  development  of  ICT  law  to  find  the  answer  to  the  question  set  in 
previous chapter, i.e. whether the law is dependent on act of the lawmaker 
or not.
Reading the above cited part of the Ovid’s poem, we might see its direct 
implications to above indicated questions. As the golden age, Ovid names 
the age when people lived together in peace and order and preserved the 
law even without existence of the code or judgments. At this age, the law 
existed spontaneously and thus, there was need neither for the lawmaker 
nor the judge. 
We are quite convinced that there used to be also a sort of golden age of 
digital information networks. By such name, we would rather call not the 
recent  age  of  still  continuing  massive  development  of  the  internet 
infrastructure  or  growth  of  social  penetration  by  its  services,  but 
particularly the age when stakeholders lived in peace and order without 
legislation or authority of the state. Many of us can still remember the age of 
various  BBS’,  FIDOs  and  other  computer  network  environments  within 
which  social  relations  started  to  develop.  Information  distributed within 
such  networks  was  almost  unexceptionally  clear,  precise  and  all  the 
communication was friendly and extremely polite. There was no need for 
any authority (administrator or even the state) to regulate the community 
and  to  punish  offenders,  as  there  were  no  offences  and  the  law  was 
spontaneously obeyed.
Above indicated example and also the wording of Ovid’s poem clearly 
show  that  the  law  as  a  normative  system  aiming  social  order  and 
development  does  not  basically  rely  on  the  acts  of  the  lawmaker,  but 
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otherwise. As already empirically gathered experience shows, it is nothing 
entirely  exceptional  when  the  law  exists  without  establishment  of  the 
lawmaker.  On  the  contrary,  there  are  cases  when  the  lawmaker  was 
institutionally established and formally performs the lawmaking activity, 
but materially, there is no law at all.8
It is not accidental that when we have to answer difficult questions in law, 
we like to turn for an advice to more experienced colleagues. Although we 
know precisely the normative utterances of the lawmaker and we are able 
to use extensive methods of their interpretation, there is still difference in 
abilities to handle difficult legal questions between us and those who have 
more  experience  –  what  might  often  mean  not  just  experience  with 
particular legal discipline, but in general with law or even more in general 
with ‘life’. Similarly to that, we find in many cases the answers, being on 
our own, even in discussions with non-lawyers,  in pubs,  at  the walk or 
when watching TV advertisements for chocolate.
There is a true story of professor of law who was asked by his former 
student on his opinion on some difficult question in law. “I looked at the 
case-law and to legal books, but I am still not sure about the answer,” said 
the student. “It is difficult question, so do not look to the case-law or legal 
books, they will only mislead you,” was the answer. “But when I read and 
interpret the code, I am not able to come to the right answer,” quarrelled the 
student and so the professor concluded by saying “do not read the code, it 
will mislead you as well.”
That empiric fact can, in our view, also support the hypothesis that the 
law is de facto  not being created but discovered. Consequently, we have to 
ask why is it necessary for the lawyer who would like to become better in 
answering questions in law, to live the life, go to pub, to go for a walk or to 
watch TV. The answer is, in our opinion, in ancient and the only exhaustive 
definition of the law saying that ‘ius est ars boni et aequi,’ i.e. the law is the 
art of good and fair.
8 As a typical example, we can take recent situation with the existence and the legitimacy of 
law in Iraq.
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The Art of Complexity [3]
Just as in the case of understanding any piece of art, understanding the 
law requires not only technically-analytical skills, but, as indicated above, 
something more. It is not accidental at all that young children are impressed 
by simple shapes and shining colours of Mickey Mouse or Pokémon and 
when  they  become  mature  or  elder,  they  turn  to  works  of  Picasso  or 
Pollock.  It  is also not accidental that we watch beginner students of law 
giving simple and ‘coloured’ answers on even complicated legal questions, 
while when becoming more experienced, their answers and arguments are 
becoming more solid, sophisticated, but also relativistic and contemplative.
It does not represent any serious challenge for a lawyer to learn the words 
of  so-called positive  law and to  acquire  analytical  skills  for  handling it. 
However, the law is not to be understood only as a set of elements that we 
are  able  to  analyze  and  link  together  by  logical  or  causal  relations.9 
Although  such  approach  might  work  in  some  cases,10 we  cannot  name 
ourselves as understanding the law unless we are able to understand it in 
its entire complexity. Here again we can spot a parallel to understanding 
the artwork – detailed analysis of separate figures on Michaelangelo’s Last 
Dinner  or  separate  analysis  of  sound  of  every  single  instrument  of  the 
orchestra in Vivaldi’s Four Seasons tells us almost nothing about the sense, 
meanings and beauty of the picture or the symphony. 
The key to understand true meanings is in law the same as in case of the 
art. It is, as already mentioned, the ability to perceive not just elements, but 
primarily  the  complexity  of  some  system.  Complexity  is  described  by 
various  theories  mostly  as  such  feature  of  a  system that  makes  it  more 
valuable than the sum of its elements.11 Taking an example by an anthill, we 
can  analyze  quality  of  every  single  ant,  but  except  their  extraordinary 
strength and diligence, they are not interesting by any special intellectual 
skills. Even more, compared to us, ants might seem being relatively dumb. 
9 There used to exist strongly influential pre-war stream in German positivist legal thinking 
called “jurisprudence of terms” based on assumption that the law is axiomatic deductive 
system, i.e. that all legal meanings can be logically deducted from basic axioms. However, 
one  of  most  reputable  representatives  of  this  school,  professor  Gustav  Jhering,  have 
admitted incompleteness of this theory by simple saying “law is not mere matter of terms”.
10 In law, we call these cases as ‘soft’.
11 For brief but exhaustive definition of complexity, see Gell-Mann, M., What is complexity? 
Complexity, vol. 1(1), p. 1.
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On the other hand, taking the anthill from the complex point of view, we 
see such logistics, construction skills or ant-resources-management that are 
able  to  comfortably  challenge  even  the  most  developed  human 
organizations.
Going back to the question set at the beginning of this sub-chapter, we see 
the difference between non-experienced and experienced lawyer not in their 
abilities to know the words of the law or to analyze them but in their abilities 
to understand the law in terms of its complexity. In this case, it is obviously 
very difficult task to understand the law as complex system, as its complexity 
is  co-created  by  the  acts  of  the  lawmaker,  judicial  decisions,  doctrine, 
outcomes of legal professionals, politics, media, technology development and 
all  other  possible  social,  national  and  even  religious  circumstances. 
Nevertheless it is, in our opinion, basic task of every lawyer to try to get the 
complex  view  on  respective  legal  problems and to  search  for  appropriate 
solutions despite the impossibility of getting the complex understanding and 
relatively low probability of coming to the right answers.12
Cyberspace 2006 [4]
The above mentioned might seem as having nothing to do with ICT law 
or the Cyberspace conference.  On the contrary,  we believe that  complex 
approach  is  the  first  and  most  important  must  for  ICT  law.13 As  the 
technology-driven  social  environment  enormously  expanded,  ICT  legal 
issues  have  to  be  almost  every  time  handled  as  hard  cases  and  all  the 
further  development  is,  besides  social  and  legal  influences,  heavily 
depending on development of technologies. Thus, almost any recent issue 
of  ICT  law  needs  the  broad  complex  understanding  not  just  of  the 
‘hardcore’  legal  matter,  but  also  of  the  whole  complex  of  interrelated 
individual, social, technology and legal elements. 
The conference was from its  very beginning planned as an event  with 
ambitions to follow the complex approach to legal problems and to give 
12 One  of  most  influential  contemporary  legal  theoreticians,  Ronald  Dworkin,  argues  that 
right answers do exist and the search for them can be successful.  Trust in his challenging 
arguments can serve us as a strong motivation for undertaking such quest again and again.
13 At this point, we feel a need to emphasize again that there is, in our view, no direct link 
between the law and the code and consequently, ICT law is not to be understood only as a 
set of codes regulating the use of information and communication technologies.
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scientists of various disciplines the broadest possible view on issues that 
matter  not  only  to  ICT  lawyers,  but  also  to  psychologists,  religionists, 
sociologists, political or media scientists and others. As the conference has 
well  established  itself  as  leading  Central  European  and  universally-
significant academic event of this kind throughout recent years, we might 
even  state  that  it  recently  helps  to  develop  mainstreams  in  both  multi-
disciplinary and cross-disciplinary (pansofic) approaches to emerging and 
globally recognized issues  of  the on-line environment.  Consequently,  we 
hope  that  the  conference  will  successfully  serve  not  only  as  a  stable 
platform for the exchange of teachings and ideas, but that its outcomes will 
even be able to develop what was previously named as the experience, i.e. 
the complex understanding of emerging problems of the on-line world(s).
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